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Abstract       
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the competitive conditions and revenue 
drivers of commercial banks in the MENA region in the context of Panzar–Rosse model. 
It is the first study of its kind that examines a large sample of MENA banks for an 
extensive period (1999–2012) during an era of political and economic unrest and 
transformation that include the the global financial crisis (2007–2009). Panel data 
analysis using fixed effects was employed in order to examine whether the competitive 
conditions in MENA banks is explained by monopoly, monopolistic competition or 
perfect competition. Findings show that MENA banks operate under monopolistic 
competition, and bank-specific variables show a positive impact on revenue. These 
findings indicate that policymakers should relax capital adequacy requirements to 
guarantee the stability of the financial system. They also raise a concern that commercial 
banks in the MENA economies tend to concentrate on traditional lending activities, 
where their competitive position may be eroded in the long run by the decreasing state 
role of Islamic banks and by mergers that are not empirically justified for MENA banks 
during this period. 
JEL classification: G21 F30 G20 
Keywords: Panzer and Rosse, Competition, Revenues, Deregulation, MENA  
Introduction and motivation 
The banking industry is a main driver of a country’s economic welfare, stability and 
growth (Claessens [1]). The critical importance of banking for the growth of developed 
and developing countries is accepted both in theoretical and empirical studies (Levine 
[2]). The examination of the banking system of developed countries, however, is  not 
very helpful in deriving conclusions for developing countries, due to differences between 
these two groups of countries in the structure of their financial sectors. Whereas 
numerous studies have examined the banking industry of developed countries, there is a 
scarcity of research papers that investigate whether bank profitability in developing 
countries is a result of a lack of competition, despite their increasing significance on a 
global scale.1  
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Developing countries are associated with weak, less developed institutional 
environments (La Porta et al. [3]), so their financial systems are mainly bank-based. 
These countries are unable to follow the sophisticated approaches intended for advanced 
economies, due to structural weaknesses in the form of the low quality of accountancy 
data, the lack of auditing companies, accounting or risk measurement practices or other 
differences (Gonzalez-Rodriguez [5]). For that reason, this study will initially examine 
whether revenues of the banking sector in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region are due to monopolistic conditions and help to derive significant conclusions 
about the viability of the financial sector—hitherto empirically unaccounted for in 
current literature whilst also significantly extending our understanding of 
competitiveness in developing countries. To examine it, we use the Panzar and Rosse [6] 
model. 
The importance of this study is threefold. First, investigating competitive conditions of 
MENA banks is crucial not only in terms of policy implications to optimally structure 
the banking system of these countries but, most importantly, for the efficient allocation 
of funds and long-term sustainable development. If the increase in banking revenues is 
due to perfect competition, instead of operating in a monopoly, then banks are expected 
to finance their needs at a lower cost and accept more feasible projects that will boost 
economic growth in this area. Second, research into the competitiveness of the banking 
industry in MENA countries is not as common as research for Europe, USA and Canada. 
This paper is the first to cover 11 MENA countries for an extended and recent period 
(14 years) in the context of Panzar and Rosse, filling a significant gap in the research. 
Third, we examine if foreign ownership and state ownership have the effect, as 
suggested by liberalisation processes employed by regulators, to promote competition, 
thus extending previous research (Turk-Ariss [7]; Bikker et al. [8]).2 Finally, we 
investigate if capital adequacy and bank size, and other firm-level factors lead to 
increased revenues in the MENA region.3 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. ‘‘The  hypotheses’’ section formulates the 
hypotheses that are examined in this study. ‘‘MENA banking industry’’ section  discusses 
major developments in the banking sector of the examined countries. ‘‘Literature 
review’’ section provides an overview of related banking. ‘‘Data and methodology’’ 
section presents the sample and the methodology used, and ‘‘Empirical results’’ section 
describes the empirical results. The conclusion and policy implications are discussed in 
‘‘Conclusion’’ section. 
 
The hypotheses 
We investigate the validity of three hypotheses. First, we examine the hypothesis (H1) 
that commercial banks operating in MENA countries increase revenue due to 
monopolistic competition. To examine this hypothesis, we compute the H value and use 
the Wald test in the Panzar–Rosse model. If H value is larger than zero and smaller than 
unity whilst Wald test results indicate that H = 0 and H = 1 is rejected, then the 
hypothesis H1 is supported. Second, we test the hypothesis (H2) that commercial banks 
in MENA countries have more revenue if they decrease state control and increase foreign 
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stake. To examine this hypothesis, we compute the significance and magnitude of 
coefficients of state. If our hypothesis is correct, this should support the assumption of 
Shleifer and Vishny [11] and Shleifer [12] that state firms are inefficient due to 
government policies that transfer resources for political reasons. Third, we test the 
hypothesis (H3) that commercial banks in MENA countries have more revenue are 
affected by bank-specific variables. 
MENA banking industry 
The MENA region has been considered to be one of the world’s most troubled regions, 
especially since 1945. It consists of 17 countries, all of which, with the exception of 
Lebanon, have mainly Muslim populations (Lowe [13]). A number of MENA economies 
(Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan among others) have launched economic reforms 
during the last 35 years and witnessed the liberalisation of their financial systems (Turk-
Ariss [7]; Naceur and Omran [14]). Development of the banking sectors in the MENA 
countries  differs from one country to another. The oil-rich countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC)
4
 cover a region where the process of financial liberalisation 
and deregulation have been accelerated as part of the GCC plan to transform its members 
from oil-based economies to market-based. According to the IMF [15], the hydrocarbon 
exports of these countries account for approximately 50% of the region’s GDP. As a 
result of increasing oil prices, GDP growth in 2003–2007 accelerated to 6.5%, 
significantly higher than its previous 4%. However, the global financial crisis of 2008 
and its consequences, as well as the 2010 Arab uprising negatively influenced these 
economies with real GDP slowing down since then. On the other hand, despite the 
country’s economic importance, the financial sector in Egypt is less developed when 
compared to those of GCC economies (Omran [16]). Whereas many banks in Egypt are 
family-owned, the state controls most of the specialised banks in the country (Neceur et 
al. [17]). Nevertheless, since the banking law in Egypt was enacted in 1975 (Central 
Bank of Egypt [18]), significant merger and acquisitions activity has taken place, 
particularly since 2005, resulting in increased foreign participation and a decreased role 
for the state. Lebanon has a more modern banking sector, compared with Egypt, and 
from 1995, the bank liquidity and capital adequacy in Lebanon have been in line 
with Bank for International Settlements (BIS) standards (Naceur and Kandil [19]). 
Finally, Jordanian national currency depreciated after the 1988–1989 crises, forcing the 
government to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The Jordanian 
government subsequently introduced a stabilisation programme, leading to privatisation, 
restructuring the financial sector (Bdour and Al-khoury [20]), whilst also removing, in 
1997, the maximum limit of foreign direct investments. According to the 2000 banking 
law [37], the country’s banks are required to comply, inter alia, with a number of 
conditions in terms of registration and license fees, while also offering financial 
consulting and investment portfolio services. 
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Literature review 
Whereas structural approaches examine whether market concentration reduces 
competitive conditions in a market by adopting collusive behaviour among enterprises 
(Berger [21]; Bikker and Bos [22]), non-structural paradigms examine factors, other than 
structure and concentration, which influence market competition. The Panzar and Rosse 
[6] model applied in this study belongs to the latter approach and estimates equations 
that assume revenue is a function of input prices and other variables. By computing the 
summation of elasticity of revenues to input prices, also called H-statistic, we make 
conclusions about equilibrium conditions, as described in Table 3. The competitive 
environment is considered to be monopolistic competition when the H-statistic takes a 
value between zero and the unity, whilst it is regarded as perfectly competitive if the H-
statistic is equal to one (Panzar and Rosse [6]). 
In the long run, in a competitive equilibrium, total revenues increase whenever input 
prices increase. A bank that is unable to anticipate input price hikes,  will exit the sector, 
while the banks that remain in the market will face increasing demand that will lead to 
increasing output prices and revenues in the same proportion as cost. In that way, the H-
statistic is equal to one (Gunalp and Celik [23]; Turk-Ariss [7]; Claessens [1]). 
The Panzar and Rosse model has been adopted by numerous studies in both developed 
and developing economies (Turk-Ariss [7]; Molyneux et al. [9]; Mamatzakis [10]).. 
Early studies in developed markets found mixed results regarding competitive 
conditions. Canadian banks, trust companies and mortgage companies (Nathan and 
Neave [24]), and banks in Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain 
(Molyneux et al. [9]) operated under monopolistic competition, whilst Molyneux et al. 
[25] provide evidence that commercial banks in Japan were operating under a monopoly 
in 1986 which developed into monopolistic competition in 1988. De Rozas [26] provides 
evidence that the Spanish banking sector is more competitive among larger banks and 
found increasing competition in the 1980 s, attributed to liberalisation. A growing body 
of literature has also been focused on emerging markets. Mamatzakis et al. [10] assessed 
whether structural reforms made the banking industry in central and Eastern Europe 
more competitive and found that with the exception of Latvia, they operated under 
monopolistic competition. Gunalp and Celik [23] examined banks in Turkey during 
1990 s and their findings suggest that Turkish banks gained their revenue under 
monopolistic competition and that they were positively influenced by liberalisation and 
deregulation measures. In the same context, the IMF [15] estimated the degree of bank 
competition for UK, USA and Eurozone economies and found that competition 
converged after the introduction of the European monetary union, whilst the 2008 
financial crisis resulted in declining competition in several countries, in particular where 
large credit and housing booms had headed the crisis. Olivero and Jeon [27] investigated 
how competition in banking affected the effectiveness of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in selected emerging Asian and Latin American countries 
between 1996 and 2006. By applying the methodology proposed by Panzar and Rosse 
[6], they concluded that the banking sectors in Latin America and Asia are categorised as 
monopolistically competitive. Additionally, the level of competition in Angola’s banking 
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industry was assessed by Barros and Mendes [28] using the Panzar–Rosse model over 
the period 2005 to 2014. Results confirm that the Angolan banking sector operates under 
monopolist competition. After examining the banking system in Uganda, Hauner and 
Peiris[29] concluded that large banks and foreign-owned banks perform more efficiently 
than others, whereas the efficiency of small banks has dropped with the increase in 
competitive pressure. 
A limited number of studies have examined MENA region banks. Murjan and Ruza [30] 
used the Panzar and Rosse model to examine the dominant competitive conditions of 
banks from nine Arab Middle Eastern countries, during the period 1993–1997. They 
found that the banking sector in that region had been operating under conditions of 
monopolistic competition. Evidence of the degree of competition using P-R methodology 
on the MENA banking sector is extended in Turk-Ariss [7] who investigated the degree 
of market power and competitiveness of 12 banking markets in MENA, finding that, 
with the exception of North African countries, banks in the region operate under 
monopolistic competition. Polemis [31] assessed the level of banking competition in 
eight MENA economies over the period 1997–2012 and confirmed evidence in favour of 
a monopolistically competitive industry, in line with Turk-Ariss [7]. 
 
Data and methodology 
Data 
In this paper we examine 149 banks from 11 MENA countries, in particular Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) during the period 1999–2012, Kuwait having the smallest 
number of operating banks (5) and Lebanon the largest (35). We use Bankscope database 
as the source of study data. We include all the banks, under the condition operating for at 
least 3 years during the period examined. Table 1lists the number of banks by country 
and by their ownership characteristics. 
 
Table 1 Number of banks in the sample 
Country  Total number of banks Domestic banks  Foreign banks 
Bahrain  10 7 3 
Kuwait  5 5 0 
Oman  6 2 4 
Qatar  7 6 1 
Saudi Arabia 8 8 0 
United Arab Emirates  18 15 3 
Egypt 23 11 12 
Jordan  11 9 2 
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Lebanon 35 30 5 
Morocco 13 9 4 
Tunisia  13 7 6 
Total  149 109 40 
 
Statistics describing the main variables used in our analysis are illustrated in Table 2. We 
report average values and standard deviation (in brackets) for the full sample of MENA 
economies over the study period (1999–2012). Bank profitability and bank revenues in 
higher-income economies, namely in UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and 
Bahrain, are above the average profitability of banks in the area, whereas bank 
profitability in low-income MENA economies such as Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon and 
Morocco is below the average. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for selected bank profitability and revenue variables 
(average 1999-2012) 
Variable 
/Country   
ROA TR/TA II/TA EQAS SIZE LOANAST  SECAST 
Bahrain  1.04 
(1.15) 
0.031 
(0.023)    
0.023 
(0.022)        
11.04 
 (2.76)         
1172 
 (1010)   
44.31    
 (12.78)      
0.250   
 (0.13)   
Oman  1.89 
(1.28) 
0.077 
(0.046) 
0.064 
(0.046)   
12.97  
(2.24)         
390 
(416) 
69.44 
 (7.97)        
0.101 
(0.061)      
Qatar  2.46 
(1.13) 
0.030 
(0.023)   
(0.017 
(0.021) 
13.90 
(3.63)           
1123 
(1810)   
57.26  
(6.99)        
0.206 
(0.163)      
Saudi 
Arabia 
2.23 
(1.58) 
0.045 
(0.016) 
0.032 
(0.008) 
12.18   
(3.11)           
2290 
(1741)     
50.78  
 (9.62)         
0.308 
(0.094)      
UAE 2.48 
(1.55) 
0.075 
(0.051) 
.060 
(0.050) 
17.11 
(5.630)          
1251 
(1890)   
61.74 
(11.14)          
0.076 
(0.058)       
Kuwait  1.86 
(1.52) 
0.055 
(0.025) 
0.043 
(0.024) 
12.19 
(2.70)           
1420  
(1207) 
54.68 
(10.93)           
0.233 
(0.108)      
Egypt  0.89 
(1.72) 
0.068 
(0.029) 
0.051 
(0.024) 
9.60 
(4.79)          
576 
(932) 
39.87  
(11.96)           
0.252 
(0.120)      
Jordan  1.23 
(1.06) 
0.031 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
11.77    
(6.42)       
 858 
(1280)  
44.01 
(7.41)           
0.176 
(0.072)        
Lebanon  0.76 
(0.846) 
0.068 
(0.035) 
0.059 
(0.030) 
8.94 
(4.52)           
340 
(489) 
26.40  
(8.69)         
0.351 
(0.120)       
Morocco  0.79 
(1.18) 
0.215 
(1.28) 
0.206 
(1.28) 
7.85  
(2.99)           
1200 
(1030) 
45.90 
(20.10)         
1.12  
(7.63)      
Tunisia  0.30 
(4.51) 
0.044 
(0.024) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
11.54 
(13.99)       
185 
(165) 
62.67 
(23.31)         
0.074  
(0.110)       
In parentheses the standard deviation 
Table 2 also indicates that Omani commercial banks, followed by UAE banks rely 
heavily on interest income affecting total revenue to assets (TR/TA) and Interest Income 
to Total Assets (II/TA). The capitalisation of commercial banks also differs depending 
on the country. Whilst the average ratio of equity to assets (EQAS) of banks in the 
MENA region in our sample that operate in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait 
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and Qatar are better capitalised than banks in other MENA countries probably due to 
regulatory interventions. High capitalisation ratios indicate that banks have the capacity 
to expand lending without the need to raise capital (Mamatzakis et al. [10]). 
 
Methodology 
The H-statistic has been developed to discriminate between monopolistic, perfectly 
competitive and monopolistically competitive markets (Panzar and Rosse [6]), based on 
a general banking model that determines revenue TR for a financial institution by 
multiplying profit-maximising quantity and price. Molyneux et al. [9] argue that H-
statistic values can be anywhere between minus infinity and unity. If the H-statistic is 
negative, the banking market is characterised as monopoly, and increasing prices will 
eventually decrease output (Mamatzakis et al. [10]). The equilibrium test in the Panzar 
and Rosse model is calculated as the sum of input prices elasticities with the return on 
average assets (ROA). If the hypothesis that the value of H-statistic is zero is tested and 
not rejected, this would imply equilibrium conditions. Table 3 summarises the 
discriminatory power of the H-statistic. 
 
Table 3. The discriminatory power of 𝐇 
Values of H Competitive environment  
H≤ 0 
 
 
∞ < 𝐻 < 1 
 
H=1 
Monopoly: H is a decreasing function of the perceived demand elasticity. Banks operate under 
monopolistic profit maximisation conditions. 
 
Monopolistic competition. H is an increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity. 
 
Perfect competition. Free entry equilibrium with full efficient capacity utilisation    
  Source: Bikker and Haaf (2002) 
 
There are a number of assumptions (Nathan and Neave [24]; Molyneux et al. [25]) that need 
to be considered in order to implement the Panzar–Rosse model in the current study. The first 
of these assumptions is widely used in banking literature: banks in the market have to be 
treated as single-product firms, as banks can use their labour, capital, deposits and short-term 
funding as inputs in generating interest revenues. Second, it has to be taken into account that 
higher-quality services are not related to higher input prices that generate higher revenues 
because the bias of the H-statistic may result from this correlation. Third, one needs to 
assume that the economic environment for this study can be unpredictable or unstable; hence, 
to overcome this issue, panel data analysis should be used. Nevertheless, as noted by 
Mamatzakis et al. [10], the Panzar and Rosse approach enjoys simplicity and transparency, 
without a decline in efficiency. In addition, data availability problems are reduced because 
revenue data tend to be more noticeable than output prices, enabling an investigation at a 
bank level, and decreasing misspecification of market restrictions, and thus, it is suitable for 
examining banking in MENA economies. 
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Following Nathan and Neave [24] Molyneux et al. [9], Mamatzakis et al. [10], and Turk-
Ariss [7], the current study estimates two measures of revenue (total revenue to total assets 
(TR/TA) and interest revenue to average total assets (II/TA), which are explained by factor 
prices and other bank-specific variables for commercial banks in 11 MENA economies over 
the period 1999–2012 using panel data: 
𝑳𝒏𝑻𝑹/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =
 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕𝜹𝟐𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝜹𝟑𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝜹𝟒𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻𝑹𝒀 + 𝜹𝟓𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 + 𝜺       
(1) 
 
Where TR/TA is total revenue computed as the summation of interest income and non-
interest income divided by total assets as in Molyneux et al. [25] and Turk-Ariss [7] who 
argued that as most of modern commercial banks increasingly rely on fee-related 
banking and financial services as well as providing loans, we should take account of fee-
based activities and not only interest-based activities. Nevertheless, interest revenue 
(II/TA) is also used to represent the version that has been used inter alia by Molyneux et 
al. [25] 
 
𝑳𝒏𝑰𝑰/𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 =
 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟐𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝜹𝟑𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝜹𝟒𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻𝑹𝒀 + 𝜹𝟓𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 +
𝜺      (2) 
PF represents the unit price of funds, proxied by interest expenses over total deposits; PL 
is the unit price of labour, as the ratio of staff expenses over total assets;
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 PK denotes the 
unit price of capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets to include equipment 
ATMs computers, premises, advertisement and other non-interest expenses (Molyneux et 
al. [9]; Gunalp and Celik [23]). The unit prices of PF, PK and PL which are funds, 
capital and labour, respectively, are the proxies of these prices of commercial banks in 
the MENA economies. In the notation of Eqs. (1), (2) and (3), H-statistic is the 
summation of (𝛽1  + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3) .  
This paper use two variables to account for bank-specific risk, namely total equity to 
assets ratio (EQAS) and loans to assets ratio (LOANAST). We expect better capitalised 
banks and banks that allocate a larger proportion of assets to loans to be more profitable, 
the latter because a larger proportion of loans is associated with more risk and return 
(Molyneux et al. [9]; Gunalp and Celik [23]). Size provides indication for possible 
economies of scale. The securities to total assets ratio (SECAST) is a proxy of profit-
bearing assets .However, investing too much in securities at the expense of issuing loans 
may decrease bank profitability. To investigate whether state and foreign ownership have 
an impact on bank revenue, we include a dummy variable that accounts for state control 
and foreign ownership, respectively. In particular, we categorise a bank as a state-owned 
bank if the government ownership is larger than 50%. Similarly, if the majority (more 
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than 50%) of a bank’s shares belong to foreign investors, we consider the bank to be 
foreign owned. Table 4 summarises the definitions of variables used in assessing the 
competition of commercial banks and equilibrium tests. 
Table 4.  Definitions of variables used in assessing the competition of commercial banks 
and equilibrium tests. 
Variable  Description  
Ln Natural Logarithm  
TR/TA Total revenue to total assets. Total revenues include revenues generated from loans and 
advances as well as other interest income containing interest from long term claims, 
government securities, commissions, and others 
II/TA Interest income to total assets 
ROA Return on average assets is the return generated from the assets financed by the bank. (net 
profit over average total assets) 
PF The unit price of funds proxied by the ratio of interest expense to total deposits. Interest 
expense includes interest paid on deposits and commissions expense and payments.  
 
PL The unit price of labour proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to the total assets. 
Personnel expenses include wages and salaries, social security contributions, contribution to 
pension funds and others.  
 
PK The unit price of capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets. Capital expenses refer 
to costs spending on fixed assets. Fixed assets include tangible assets fixed assets (land, 
buildings and installations, furniture office, computers, ATMs, technological items) and 
intangible fixed assets (such as goodwill, software, research and development expenses, etc).  
SIZE Total assets represent a proxy for bank size including earning assets + cash and due from 
banks + foreclosed real estate + fixed assets + goodwill.  
SECAST Total securities to total assets include loans and advances + trading securities + derivatives + 
available for the sale securities + held to maturity securities + equity investments 
+government bonds+ other securities.  
EQAS Equity to total assets. This variable is used to measure capital adequacy, computed as equity 
to total assets. High capital-asset ratios indicate low leverage and therefore lower risks.  
LOANAST Net loans to total assets. This is a measure of liquidity computed as loans to total assets. 
Higher ratios imply lower liquidity.   
FORE Dummy variable for foreign ownership  
STATE Dummy variable for state ownership  
 Source: Bankscope database  
Following Molyneux et al. [9], Mamatzakis et al. [10] and Turk-Ariss [7], we investigate 
the long-term equilibrium conditions by examining whether the H–statisticis statistically 
different from zero, by using the following equation where the dependent variable is a 
return on total assets (ROA) as follows: 
𝑳𝒏𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑭𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑷𝑲𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒍𝒏𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 +
𝜸𝟐𝒍𝒏𝑬𝑸𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝑨𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝟐𝑭𝑶𝑹𝑬 + 𝜹𝟑𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑻𝑬 + 𝜹𝟒𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻𝑹𝒀 + 𝜹𝟓𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹 +
𝜺       (3) 
This study uses unbalanced panel data to estimate the reduced-form revenue equation 
implied by the Panzar–Rosse model. We use fixed effects models to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, and we examine the suitability of fixed effects versus random 
effects for this model based on a Hausman specification test, whilst also applying robust 
standard errors to correct heteroscedasticity as noted by Baltagi [32]. 
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 Empirical results 
 Empirical results for Competitive conditions  
This part of the analysis examines competition (H-statistic) and individual factors using 
fixed effect models. We also account for country and time effects and competitive 
structure differences. 
Competition conditions 
Tables 5 and 6 report the regression results using total revenues (TR/TA) and interest 
income (II/TA) as a dependent variable, respectively. The regression coefficients for the 
sum of input price (PF, PK and PL) are all positive and significant at the 1% confidence 
level in Tables 5 and 6. The coefficient of the price of fund, PF, is found positive and 
significant for all regressions in Table 6, implying that the higher the interest expenses 
are over short-term funds and deposits, the higher the revenues will be. Also, the price of 
capital (PK) and price of labour (PL) are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that an increasing price of labour and capital leads to increasing income, 
providing some indication of the importance of investments (e.g., to strengthen ATM 
networks) that become increasingly crucial in modern banking. These results are in line 
with findings in emerging markets as in Turkey (Gunalp and Celik [23]). 
Table 5 Panzar and Rosse model competition results, using total revenue to average 
total assets as dependent variable 
 Fixed effect 1 Fixed effect 2 Fixed effect 3 Fixed effect 4 
LnPF 0.162*** 
(5.324) 
0.318*** 
(13.604) 
0.240*** 
(8.039) 
0.345*** 
(14.403) 
LnPK 0.139*** 
(5.848) 
0.125*** 
(5.120) 
0.098*** 
(4.047) 
0.098*** 
(3.946) 
LnPL 0.433*** 
(13.134) 
0.384*** 
(11.460) 
0.394*** 
(11.756) 
0.353*** 
(10.450) 
LnSECAST -0.021** 
(-1.409) 
-0.030** 
(-1.945) 
-0.020 
(-1.359) 
-0.027* 
(-1.784) 
LnSIZE 0.013 
(0.689) 
-0.093*** 
(-6.032) 
-0.007 
(-0.454) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.923) 
LnEQAS 0.058** 
(1.964) 
0.029 
(0.989) 
0.046 
(1.528) 
0.040 
(1.300) 
LnLOANAST 0.208*** 
(5.648) 
0.168*** 
(4.503) 
0.125*** 
(3.462) 
0.133*** 
(3.662) 
FORE -0.038 
(-0.591) 
-0.099 
(-1.475) 
-0.011 
(-0.185) 
-0.091 
(-1.405) 
INTERCEPT 
 
-1.990*** 
(-5.334) 
-0.064 
(-0.208) 
-0.710*** 
(-2.500) 
0.228 
(0.895) 
YEAR 
EFFECTS 
YES NO YES NO 
COUNTRY YES YES NO NO 
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EFFECTS 
Adj-R2  0.65 0.63 0.59 0.58 
F-statistic 
Prob(F-statistic) 
19.45 
0.000 
19.39 
0.000 
16.60 
0.000 
17.03 
0.000 
Hausman Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H-value 0.73 0.83 0.73 0.80 
Wald test, H=0 
Prob 
256.1 
0.00 
342.2 
0.00 
260.4 
0.00 
324.5 
0.00 
Wald test, H=1 
Prob 
33.27 
0.00 
14.69 
0.00 
34.22 
0.00 
20.81 
0.00 
Dependent variable: Ln (TR/TA). TR/TA =Total revenue to total assets, PF= price of fund (interest expense to deposits), 
PK= price of capital (non-interest expenses to fixed assets, PL =price of labour (personal expenses to total assets), SECAST 
=securities to total assets, SIZE= Total assets, EQAS= equity to total assets, LOANAST= net loans to assets, FORE= 
dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership 
*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level, and ***significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 6 Panzar and Rosse model competition, using interest income to average total 
assets (II/TA) as dependent variable 
 Fixed effect  5 Fixed effect 6 Fixed effect 7 Fixed effect  8 Fixed effect 9 
LnPF 
 
0.314*** 
(6.957) 
0.457*** 
(13.333) 
0.413*** 
(9.208) 
0.495*** 
(13.871) 
0.311*** 
(7.008) 
LnPK 
 
0.117*** 
(3.309) 
0.104*** 
(2.913) 
0.057 
(1.580) 
0.059 
(1.617) 
0.112*** 
(3.178) 
LnPL 
 
0.440*** 
(9.002) 
0.396*** 
(8.086) 
0.382*** 
(7.598) 
0.349*** 
(6.981) 
0.440*** 
(9.161) 
LnSECAST 
 
0.004 
(0.187) 
-0.000 
(-0.029) 
0.007 
(0.307) 
0.005 
(0.243)  
LnSIZE 
 
0.034 
(1.204) 
-0.086*** 
(-3.799) 
-0.004 
(-0.177) 
-0.075*** 
(-3.352) 
0.031 
(1.088) 
LnEQAS 
 
0.030 
(0.693) 
-0.004 
(-0.093) 
0.013 
(0.297) 
0.003 
(0.081) 
 
LnLOANAST 
 
0.232*** 
(4.262) 
0.197*** 
(3.617) 
0.105* 
(1.947) 
0.119** 
(2.218) 
0.228*** 
(4.237) 
FORE 
 
-0.025 
(-0.259) 
-0.093 
(-0.949) 
0.018 
(0.192) 
-0.059 
(-0.622) 
-0.021 
(-0.223) 
STATE 
 
0.100 
(1.158) 
0.162* 
(1.872) 
-0.004 
(-0.051) 
0.015 
(0.176) 
0.090 
(1.081) 
INTERCEPT 
 
-2.163*** 
(-3.881) 
0.015 
(0.0335) 
-0.491 
(-1.154) 
0.527 
(1.399) 
-2.039*** 
(-3.928) 
YEAR 
EFFECTS 
YES NO YES NO YES 
COUNTRY 
EFFECTS 
YES YES NO NO YES 
R2Adj 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.64 
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Hausman Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H-value 0.87 0.95 0.85 0.90 0.86 
Wald test, H=0 
Prob 
162.2 
0.000 
211.5 
0.000 
154.3 
0.000 
186.9 
0.000 
165.2 
0.000 
Wald test, H=1 
Prob 
3.45 
0.06 
0.40 
0.52 
4.51 
0.03 
2.09 
0.14 
4.09 
0.04 
Dependent variable: Ln (II/TA). (II/TA)= Interest revenue to total assets. Independent variables PF= price of fund (interest 
expense to deposits), PK= price of capital (non-interest expenses to fixed assets, PL =price of labour (personal expenses to 
total assets), SECAST =securities to total assets, SIZE= Total assets, EQAS= equity to total assets, LONAAST= net loans to 
assets, FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership.  
*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level, and ***significant at the 1% level 
 
Regarding H value (the sum of price elasticity: PF, PK, PL), we find that all  H values in 
the models are less than one and greater than zero, and both hypotheses where 
the H value is equal to unity and the H value is equal to zero are rejected, indicating that 
commercial banks operating in the MENA economies were earning their revenues (total 
revenue to total assets and interest income to total assets) under monopolistic 
competition for the period of the study. The H-statistic for Table 3 varies between 0.73 
and 0.83 for total revenues (TR/TA) and ranges between 0.86 and 0.90 for interest 
income, suggesting evidence of monopolistic competition. More specifically, Wald 
tests H = 0 and H = 1 for banks operating in 11 MENA economies included in the sample 
reject perfect and monopoly conditions of the banking industry, whilst the value of the 
H-statistic is also not negative. In particular, results of the Wald tests (H = 0 and H = 1) 
in eight out of nine tested models confirm that banks operate under monopolistic 
competition, providing support for hypothesis (H1) that commercial banks in the MENA 
region increase revenue due to monopolistic competition. Findings of the H-statistic are 
in line with those in other studies in MENA economies and other emerging markets 
(Gunalp and Celik [23]; Hauner and Peiris [29]; Turk-Ariss [7]). A monopolistic 
competition structure can be considered consistent with product differentiation, in spite 
of their main business being fairly similar. 
State and Foreign ownership 
To examine how state and foreign ownership affects revenues and profitability, we use 
state and foreign ownership dummy variables. Coefficients of foreign dummies are 
negative and insignificant, providing evidence that banks with foreign ownership do not 
generate more or less revenue than other banks. From the other side, coefficients of state 
dummies are positive and insignificant, providing evidence that state bank ownership 
does not generate more or less revenue than other banks, either with or without 
accounting for year and/or country effects. 
These are significant findings, indicating that the policy of reducing the role of state 
banks and increasing foreign participation had no effect whatsoever in the area during 
this long period, questioning the claim that privatisation leads to a more effective 
banking industry. The coefficient of foreign ownership (FORE) in Tables 5, 6and 7 is 
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insignificant in all but one regression, indicating that the hypothesis H2, that MENA 
banks are more profitable if they increase foreign ownership, does not hold. To examine 
the hypothesis that state ownership is associated with decreasing profitability, we 
examine the significance and magnitude of coefficients of state ownership (STATE). In 
all but one regression in Tables 6 and 7, the coefficient of state ownership is 
insignificant whilst in one case it is significant and positive, indicating that the 
hypothesis H2 does not hold, either. Such finding, not recognised by previous studies, 
that questions the validity of regulatory practices, forced by large transnational 
organisations which aim to decrease state ownership and increase foreign control of the 
banking sector. 
 
 
Table 7 Panzar and Rosse model test using ROA as dependent Variable   
 Fixed effect  10 Fixed effect  11 Fixed effect  12 Fixed effect  13 
LnPF -0.070 
(-1.341) 
0.089** 
(2.233) 
-0.15*** 
(-3.011) 
0.060 
(1.539) 
LnPK 0.148*** 
(3.540) 
0.137*** 
(3.231) 
0.171*** 
(4.259) 
0.166*** 
(4.024) 
LnPL -0.088 
(-1.549) 
-0.128** 
(-2.217) 
-0.102** 
(-1.877) 
-0.161 
(-2.884) 
LnSECAST 0.020 
(0.712) 
0.001 
(0.054) 
0.006 
(0.247) 
-0.019 
(-0.720) 
LnSIZE 0.019 
(0.534) 
-0.022 
(-0.821) 
0.114*** 
(3.904) 
0.044* 
(1.731) 
LnEQAS 0.845*** 
(12.005) 
0.835*** 
(12.222) 
1.000*** 
(15.549) 
0.996*** 
(15.337) 
LnLOANAST 0.172** 
(2.625) 
0.110* 
(1.683) 
0.243*** 
(3.987) 
0.216*** 
(3.453) 
FORE 0.209* 
(1.793) 
0.181 
(1.541) 
0.139 
(1.283) 
0.039 
(0.355) 
STATE 0.070 
(0.685) 
0.063 
(0.612) 
-0.066 
(-0.690) 
-0.083 
(-0.838) 
INTERCEPT 
 
-3.46*** 
(-4.828) 
-2.33*** 
(-4.130) 
-5.63*** 
(-11.353) 
-4.31*** 
(-9.706) 
YEAR 
EFFECTS 
YES NO YES NO 
COUNTRY 
EFFECTS 
YES YES NO NO 
R2Adj 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.50 
Hausman test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
H- value -0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.06 
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Wald test, H=0 
Prob 
 0.017 
 0.896 
1.647 
 0.199 
 1.131 
 0.287 
 0.818 
 0.365 
Dependent variable: Ln (ROA). ROA=return on average assets. Independent variable: PF= price of fund (interest expense to 
deposits), PK= price of capital (non-interest expenses to fixed assets, PL =price of labour (personal expenses to total assets), 
SECAST =securities to total assets, SIZE= Total assets, EQAS= equity to total assets, LONAAST= net loans to assets, 
FORE= dummy for foreign ownership, STATE= dummy for state ownership  
*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level, and ***significant at the 1% level 
Firm – specific factors 
 
We also examine the bank-specific factors that affect revenues. The coefficient of 
Securities investments (SECAST) is negative and significant at 5% with TR/TA 
indicating that banks’ securities do not contribute in terms of overall revenue in MENA 
economies. With respect to the Capital Adequacy (EQAS) variable, all results are 
positive and significant at the 10% and 5% level, implying that banks that operate in the 
MENA region with higher capital adequacy ratios tend to create more revenues; 
supporting the argument that capital adequacy is positively associated with revenues. 
The regression coefficient of bank size (SIZE) is negative and statistically significant 
when we don’t account for Year effects, suggesting that size in terms of assets in MENA 
economies contributed to reducing revenues and implying that larger banks were, in 
some cases, less efficient than smaller banks. Finally Loans over Assets (LOANAST) is 
found to be positive and significant in all regressions indicating that banks focused in 
traditional loan activities, strengthen their revenues and profits compared to their peers. 
The positive and significant coefficient of LOANAST, in conjunction with the negative 
and significant coefficient of SECAST, would raise a concern that commercial banks in 
the MENA economies tend to concentrate on traditional lending activities, where their 
competitive position may be eroded in the long run by Islamic banks, confirming the 
findings of Olson and Zoubi [33] that Islamic banks are more revenue efficient than 
conventional banks because Islamic banks hold more profitable assets than the loans and 
securities held by conventional banks. Given that capital adequacy (EQAS) and loans 
(LOANAST) enhance revenues, the hypothesis H3 that commercial banks operating in 
MENA countries increase revenue due to firm-specific factors is not rejected. Such 
results are considered to be important to regulators, policy makers and bank managers in 
the MENA economies as to highlight that the growing in total assets by acquisition or 
mergers may not be appropriate and effective, suggesting that smaller banks can be more 
efficient in reducing asymmetric information problems, partly in line with findings of 
Turk-Ariss [7]. Finally, net loans to total assets (LOANAST), a variable that proxies 
liquidity (Mamatzakis et al. [10]), is statistically significant, implying that a larger 
proportion of loan to total assets generates more interest income and total revenues for 
MENA commercial banks. Overall, these findings confirm that commercial banks in 
MENA economies tend to focus on traditional lending activities, implying an 
unwillingness or inability of commercial banks to generate income from new investment 
opportunities. 
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Test for Market Equilibrium 
 
The validity of the Panzar and Rosse model, based on the assumption of equilibrium 
conditions, is tested by employing Eq. (3) and by using the Wald test to examine if null 
hypothesis H = 0 holds, the latter as advocated by a number of authors (Gunalp and 
Celik, [23]). If rejected, then the industry is not regarded as being in an equilibrium 
level. Being in equilibrium does not exclude competitive positions changing later on, but 
rather indicates that changes in the banking sector are gradual (Mamatzakis et al. [10]). 
Equilibrium tests for the fixed effects models are presented in Table 7. 
The suitability of the fixed effects models is verified by the Hausman test. Results also 
confirm that the equilibrium hypothesis, H value is equal to zero, is not rejected in any 
of the examined regressions. Therefore, the overall findings suggest that commercial 
banks operating in MENA economies were under long-term equilibrium of monopolistic 
competition for the study period. These findings support the validity of the Panzar–Rosse 
model as examined in Eqs. (1) and (2), validating our findings in general, and confirming 
the hypothesis (H1) that commercial banks operating in MENA countries increase 
revenue due to monopolistic competition. This finding is in line with findings of Gunalp 
and Celik [23], Hauner and Peiris [29],  and Turk-Ariss [7]. The paper provides evidence 
that the market in MENA countries is under monopolistic competition during the period 
that includes the global financial crisis of 2007 and the Arab Spring, and is the first of its 
kind for the examined period that takes account for country and year effects. In addition, 
this is the first study of its kind that draws conclusions about equilibrium market 
conditions in 11 countries of the MENA region during the period examined (1999–
2012). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the competitive conditions of MENA banks. First, our tests reject 
the hypothesis of perfect competition and monopoly in the banking industry in eight out 
of nine regressions examined and support the hypothesis of monopolistic competition 
during the period 1999–2012. This is the first study that examines 11 MENA countries 
and takes account of year and country effects as well as bank ownership status. Second, 
we examined whether firm-specific factors lead to increasing revenues. Capital adequacy 
is also found positive and statistically significant in some cases, supporting the argument 
that well-capitalised banks may enjoy access to cheaper and less risky sources of funds. 
The coefficient of Loans over Assets is positive and significant in all regressions, 
indicating that banks that focus on traditional loan activities tend to be more profitable. 
Third, we investigated whether state and foreign ownership affect performance.  
Our results confirm previous findings about the existence of monopolistic competition 
while extending past evidence in four ways. First, the results suggest that size does not 
lead to more revenue per unit of assets used, implying that smaller banks can be more 
efficient in reducing asymmetric information problems, something that confirms Turk-
Ariss [7], findings. Second, we found no support for the hypothesis that state banks are 
associated with decreasing or increasing revenues, or any support that foreign ownership 
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is a significant explanatory variable for the study group and the period examined. Third, 
we conclude that the MENA commercial banking sector’s reliance on traditional lending 
activities is not associated with effective use of other assets, confirming the findings of 
Olson and Zoubi [33] that poor asset management of these banks may lead to decreasing 
market position in the long run. Finally, we examined the validity of the Panzar and 
Rosse model by testing market equilibrium conditions and found that the equilibrium 
hypothesis is not rejected, providing evidence of presence of long equilibrium, in line 
with findings in other studies (eg. Molyneux et al. [9]; Mamatzakis et al. [10]). These 
findings are particularly important due to their policy implications, favouring inter alia 
legislation that leads to well-capitalised banks. 
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